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Abstract   
Besides the economic crisis, the Lisbon Treaty challenged and changed Denmark’s seventh Presidency of the Council 
of the EU (henceforth the EU Council Presidency), introducing the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy (henceforth The High Representative), i.e. a permanent president for the European Council 
and the Trio presidencies. Here, we investigate the democratic consequences of the changes of the EU Council 
Presidency illustrated through the case of the Danish 2012 Presidency. We evaluate the changes in an input-output 
legitimacy framework, focusing on the European Parliament (EP) and the people’s ability to affect politics during the 
EU Council Presidency. Based on the Danish case, we argue that the changes of the EU Council Presidency limit 
people’s ability to influence decision-making, as powers have been transferred to new permanent institutions. 
Zusammenfassung 
Neben der Wirtschaftskrise stellte der Vertrag von Lissabon eine Herausforderung für Dänemarks siebente EU-
Ratspräsidentschaft dar und veränderte diese, indem der neue Hohe Vertreter der EU für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik 
als ständiger Präsident des EU-Rates und der Trio-Präsidentschaft eingesetzt wurde. In diesem Artikel untersuchen wir 
am Beispiel der dänischen Präsidentschaft 2012 die Konsequenzen auf demokratischer Ebene, die mit der 
Veränderung der EU-Ratspräsidentschaft angestoßen wurden. Hierfür beurteilen wir die Veränderungen mit Hilfe 
eines Input-Output-Legitimitätsrahmen, wobei wir uns auf das Europäische Parlament (EP) und die Fähigkeit der 
Politikwirksamkeit der europäischen Bevölkerung während der EU-Ratspräsidentschaft konzentrieren. Ausgehend 
vom dänischen Beispiel ist unsere These, dass die Veränderungen in der EU-Ratspräsidentschaft die Fähigkeit der 
europäischen Bevölkerung, auf den Entscheidungsprozess Einfluss zu nehmen, einschränken, da die Gewalten auf 
neue dauerhafte Institutionen übertragen wurden. 
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Introduction 
The EU’s democratic deficit has been discussed frequently (e.g. Moravcsik 1993; Moravcsik 1991; Foellesdal 
and Hix 2006; Habermas 2009). Some authors highlight the lack of interest in and knowledge of the European 
endeavour, arguing for enhanced popular political inclusion through, for example, an enhanced pan-European 
public sphere (e.g. Habermas 2009) or extensive deliberative pooling (e.g. Fishkin and Luskin 2005; Fishkin 
1991, Ackerman and Fishkin 2004). Others argue that the EU sui generis does not as such face democratic 
legitimacy problems. Rather the problem derives from a wrong conceptualization and understanding of the nature 
of the EU (e.g. Majone 1998, Majone 2005; Moravcsik 2006, Moravcsik 2004, Moravcsik 2002).  
The democratic deficit debate divides into two sub-strands. One sub-strand is the institutional critique of the EU. 
It focuses on the fact that the only directly popularly elected body at the EU level – the European Parliament (EP) 
– for a long time, and still to a certain extent, was virtually without any significant power vis-à-vis the Council of 
the EU and the European Commission. Additionally, the EU is targeted for the fact that there is no democratic 
contestation for leadership at the EU level. For example, the Commission is criticized for not being subject to 
popular elections (e.g. Foellesdal and Hix 2006;Williams 1991). The first aspect, however, was remedied in the 
Lisbon Treaty (2009) when the co-decision procedure became the most frequently used legislative procedure, 
bringing the EP on equal footing with the Council in a large majority of policy areas.    
The second strand of the democratic deficit debate focuses on the citizens. In here, the focus has been on the fact 
that the European people have little knowledge about the European Union and that the election turnout in 
European elections is very low compared to national elections (e.g. Foellesdal and Hix 2006; Williams 1991). 
Additionally, the EP elections tend to focus on domestic rather than EU-related issues (Hix 1999), and thus are 
labelled »second-order-elections« (Reif and Schmitt 1980). Evidence for the second-order-election hypothesis, 
however, is mixed as national referendums on EU matters have proven to be addressing EU-related issues 
independently from national politics (Hobolt 2009). The two strands of the democratic deficit debate, though 
conveniently separated here, naturally go hand-in-hand.  
One of the less researched, yet important EU actor is the EU Council Presidency. With its half-yearly rotation 
amongst the EU Member States, the EU Council Presidency provides a means to remedy the remoteness of the 
EU – the »EU lies in Bruxelles« – aspect highlighted in the democratic deficit debate (e.g. Foellesdal and Hix 
2006). Furthermore, one could expect the EU Council Presidency to enhance visibility of the EU at the national 
level, as holding the EU Council Presidency provides an opportunity for member states’ governments to highlight 
EU policies on the national agenda. We here investigate the role of the EU Council Presidency in regard to 
popular legitimization of the EU. Though the EU Council Presidency is not – per se – an institution generated to 
legitimizing the EU in the eyes of the European population, we nevertheless think all aspects of Europeanization 
and the evolution of the EU institutions are relevant for analysis in a democratic perspective. Particularly, because 
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the EU institutions as such, encompassing the EU Council Presidency, all suffer severe crises when further EU 
integration is halted by, for example, popular referendums.   
Following from this, the EU Council Presidency can be expected to influence popular EU attention to some 
degree, and thus it plays a role in the discussions about the EU democratic deficit. The EU Council Presidency, 
however, changed with the Lisbon Treaty (2009). Here powers previously held by the EU Council Presidency 
were transferred to new supranational institutions. Moreover, the EU Council Presidency has gradually seen a 
transfer of powers from the decentralized Member States to centralization in Brussels. Most Presidencies are now 
Brussels-based, meaning that most Presidency-related activities take place in Brussels. Most prominently this 
includes the European Council sessions as well as the formal Council of the EU meetings. Only the informal 
Council meetings now take place in the host EU Presidency country. The question is to what extent these changes 
have an impact on the broader democratic deficit discussions. Has the critique towards the institutional and the 
popular dimensions of the democratic deficit been addressed with the new role of the EU Council Presidency? Or 
have the changes of the EU Council Presidency enhanced the democratic worries at the EU level?   
Analyses of the EU Council Presidency have focused on the administrative level, investigating how 
Europeanization of the national administration accelerates as a consequence of holding the EU Council 
Presidency (Jensen and Nedergaard 2012), and if the organization of the Presidency amongst the heterogeneous 
Member States is done within the same framework (Nedergaard and Jensen 2012). Others focus on the role of the 
EU Council Presidency in the negotiation and bargaining process, highlighting that it plays a crucial role in 
unlocking conflicting negotiations (e.g. Metcalfe 1998) as well as securing agreements during tough negotiations, 
which might otherwise be prone to fail (Tallberg 2004). Although holding the EU Council Presidency does not 
appear to be of any significant advantage to the Member State’s domestic interests due to the norms of 
impartiality and neutrality, findings notwithstanding show that being at the helm of the EU adds to the bargaining 
power of the EU Presidency country, especially in the final phase of decision-making (Schalk et al. 2007; 
Thomson 2008; Bengtsson et al. 2004).  
Still, the democratic aspect of the EU Council Presidency remains largely undiscussed. Though speculations 
appear that the rotating EU Council Presidency serves to remedy the democratic deficit, decreasing the distance 
between citizens and the EU institutions, surprisingly few studies focus on the democratic aspects of the EU 
Council Presidency (for an exception see: Crum 2009, Semetko and Valkenburg 2003).  
In this article, we apply a theoretical framework of input and output legitimacy (Scharpf 1999; Scharpf 2009) and 
investigate how the institutional changes of the Lisbon Treaty have enhanced or decreased the democratic 
problems of the EU both at the institutional and the popular dimensions. We focus on the role of the EP and the 
role of the people in broad terms as proxies for the institutional and the popular levels.  
Evaluating the Danish negotiations and achievements at the helm of the EU (2012), we find that the new role of 
the EU Council Presidency decreases people’s ability to directly impact the input-side of EU politics as power has 
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been transferred to the supranational level. However, as the Lisbon Treaty opened for enhanced powers to the EP, 
we find that the limitation for input in the decision-making process can to some extent be remedied through the 
empowered EP channels of influence. This is, however, conditioned by the ability and willingness of the national 
Presidency to adapt to new realities by strengthening its ties with the EP.  
In- and Output Legitimacy and the EU Presidency  
The democratic outlook of the EU Council Presidency can be studied with different theoretical lenses. In essence, 
the discussions involve questions and approaches that view the EU as a unique institution that should be 
legitimized accordingly (e.g. Moravcsik 1991, 1993, Majone 1998, Moravcsik 2002, Schmidt 2004, Majone 
2005) or if the EU should be legitimized like any other democratic state (Lord and Beetham 1998, Lord and 
Beetham 2001). Here, we do not actively engage with any of the strands of understanding the ontology of the 
European project. Rather, we take the point of departure that all democratic or political institutions – sui generis 
or not – should be legitimized by its population in order to function well. The EU is no exception. Hence, the EU 
should be legitimized as it is a political institution, disregarding one’s point of departure in the democratic deficit 
debate. This discussion is important when it comes to the EU Presidency, as it has – for the first time since the 
establishment of the EU – been altered with the centralization of powers in Brussels. The question is what impact 
this alternation has had on the legitimization of the EU as a democratic institution.  
The theoretical framework of input and output legitimacy, as elaborated by Scharpf, is useful in order to gain 
insight into the democratic aspects of the EU Council Presidency (e.g. Scharpf 1999, Scharpf 2011). Input 
legitimacy is popularly held as being government by the people and output-oriented legitimacy is government for 
the people. The distinction between input and output legitimacy understands the political process in terms of (1) 
decision-making process(es) (2) and outcome. Input-oriented democratic choices are legitimate because they 
reflect the will of the people. Output-oriented democratic choices are legitimate because they reflect the policy 
outcome people desire (e.g. Scharpf 1999). Looking at the democratic implications of the changes of the 
Presidency in the Lisbon Treaty, the distinction between input and output legitimacy becomes a useful analytical 
tool. As already mentioned, according to Scharpf, input legitimacy thrives when focus is on participation on the 
individual political level (Scharpf 2011; 7). Elaborating on this, we understand EU input legitimacy as 
individual’s opportunity to participate in the decision-making processes at the EU level. 
Output legitimacy, by contrast, means deriving legitimacy from the capacity to problem-solving. Thus, it focuses 
on the quality of the output of the political process, encompassing the collective ability to generate political 
outcome that is beneficial for all. Scharpf mentions four mechanisms of output-oriented legitimation: (1) electoral 
accountability through elections; (2) application of expertise in the decision-making process; (3) enhanced 
corporatist and intergovernmental agreements; and (4) pluralist policy network (Scharpf 1999). Here, we focus on 
the aspects of accountability of elections and pluralist policy network as parameters for assessing the impact of 
output legitimacy in the context of the Danish EU Council Presidency.  
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We understand electoral accountability as people’s ability to elect and keep responsible representative politicians. 
Additionally, we assess the role of pluralist networks by looking at European people’s ability to participate 
politically through multiple channels and networks – both informal and formal – to make their voices heard. The 
difference between multiple networks and direct participatory opportunities – as seen as a parameter when we 
investigate ›input legitimacy‹ – is that, with input legitimacy, we look at the European people’s ability to directly 
interact with the political systems throughout the decision-making process. Pluralist networks, conversely, such 
as regional interests represented at the EU level or interest organization etc., are networks that are more 
informally tied to the political process, enabling citizens to informally interact with the political systems. These 
networks, for example, go through interest organizations or other organizational activities. 
Denmark: A Small and – at Times – Reluctant Member State 
Being an old EU Member State, the role at the helm of the EU is nothing new for Denmark. The small country 
became member of the European Community (EC) in 1973, following a popular referendum in which a majority 
of 63 per cent favored accession. Denmark is a small open economy, and accession to the EC was motivated by 
the economic benefits achieved by free trade in the common market. Thus, the Danes have, at times, only 
reluctantly endorsed the political aspects of the EC that evolved after the 1970s. In particular, this became clear 
with the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), often referred to as Treaty of Maastricht, in 1992, and the 
establishment of a political union. A small majority of Danes rejected the TEU in a referendum, confronting the 
EU with its first severe democratic legitimacy crisis (e.g. Jensen and Nielsen 2011, Kelstrup, et al. 2012a).  
The Danish conditions for accession to the TEU were renegotiated in 1993, resulting in the Edinburgh 
Compromise. Denmark obtained four opt-outs from the TEU. All opt-outs are still in place today. They include 
(1) the third phase of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); (2) the supranational cooperation within Justice 
and Home Affairs; (3) the EU Citizenship; and (4) the dimension of defense within the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy.  
Amongst the Danish politicians, there is widespread consensus that abolition of the opt-outs should be subject to 
a popular referendum. But so far, only one of the opt-outs has been put to a referendum. It happened in 2000, 
following the launch of the Euro (1999), when accession to the EMU’s third phase was rejected by 53.1 per cent 
of the Danes. Since then, politicians tactically have waited for the momentum for a new debate on lifting at least a 
few of the opt-outs. The current Danish government announced that it intended to hold a referendum on two opt-
outs, namely Justice and Home Affairs and Defense cooperation, during the Danish EU Council Presidency 
(2012). Yet, the idea was abolished again in June 2012, most likely because of negative opinion pools, and the 
economic challenges of the Eurozone. Other rejections of the abolition of the opt-outs will most likely add to the 
success and failure of the national government, so Danish politicians are hesitant to initiate the debate if the right 
momentum does not exist (e.g. Marcussen 2009, Kelstrup, et al. 2012b).  
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The opt-out of the EMU did play a role for the maintenance of the 2012 Danish EU Council Presidency. It 
excludes the country from the informal Euro-group meetings, taking place prior to the Economic and Financial 
Council meetings (ECOFIN). However, since the role of the European Council in finding solutions to the 
Eurozone economic crisis increased, the consequences of being outside the Eurozone appeared less significant 
though the prime ministers and head of states of non-Euro countries still have to leave European Council sessions 
when Euro related questions are discussed (Christensen and Nielsen 2013).   
The EU Presidency After the Lisbon Treaty  
The EU Council Presidency is one of the most stable structures in the EU’s history. Established with the Rome 
Treaty (1957), the half-yearly rotating Presidency has largely maintained its form and purpose throughout the past 
decades. The EU Council Presidency has four key tasks. Firstly, it sets and manages the EU’s agenda by chairing 
all Council formations. Secondly, it acts as an honest broker in the inter-institutional bargaining between the 
European Commission, the EP and the Council. Thirdly, the Presidency works for Council compromises between 
the national ministers. Finally, the Presidency represents the Council in relation to third external parties outside 
the EU (e.g. Adler-Nissen, et al. 2012). Additionally, research on Member State behavior during Presidencies 
show how national governments use the opportunity at the helm of the EU to shape the political agenda and 
promote national interests (Tallberg 2003, Elgström 2003, Bengtsson et al. 2004, Thomson 2008). 
The Lisbon Treaty significantly changed the role of the Presidency, aiming at a more hierarchical and transparent 
EU decision-making process. The European Council was now provided with an independent permanent President. 
Simultaneously, foreign affairs were removed from the General Affairs Council formation and provided with a 
new independent head (i.e. the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy). Lastly, 
the Lisbon Treaty formalized the invention of the so-called Trio Presidencies. Since 2007, the three upcoming EU 
Council Presidencies have prepared and coordinated a joint Trio Presidency Program for a duration of 18 months. 
In the 2012-Presidency, Denmark formed a Trio Presidency in junction with Poland and Cyprus. The Trio 
Program aims at making the EU Council Presidencies more coherent and consistent.   
All three amendments shifted powers from the EU Council Presidency to either the newly invented post of High 
Representative of foreign affairs or the new European Council President, or sharing and coordinating the agenda 
of the EU Council Presidency with other EU Member States. All in all, the EU Council Presidency is left with 
less political weight than before (Christensen and Nielsen 2013). 
Notwithstanding, the changed nature of the EU Council Presidency must be viewed in the overall light of 
institutional changes introduced in the Lisbon Treaty. While the powers of the EU Council Presidency shifted to 
newly invented actors, these powers essentially remain with the Council of the EU and the European Council and, 
thus, the Member States. The Lisbon Treaty also made the co-decision procedure (where the Council and the EP 
co-decide) the most commonly used decision-making procedure. This way, the powers of the EP significantly 
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increased – and addressed a frequently heard critique in the democratic deficit debate. Other initiatives were 
similarly invented to increase the citizens’ role in the EU decision-making processes, for example, the ambitious 
European Citizen Initiative, empowering citizens to propose legislative proposals to the Commission (e.g. Nielsen 
2011).  
The EU Presidency: More or Less Legitimacy?  
1.1 The European Parliament (EP) 
One of the main criticisms against the EU political system is the fact that the only directly elected body – the EP 
– used to have relatively weak political decision-making powers. During successive treaty amendments, the EU 
invested massively in the EP to vindicate European standards of parliamentary accountability. By now, it is 
widely assumed that the EP is the institutional body that has gained most from the past decades evolution of the 
EU. What was originally a simple ›parliamentary assembly‹ – not very different from the assemblies 
accompanying traditional international organizations  – has now become a directly elected empowered institution, 
enjoying powers in matters of authorization of EU expenditure, law-making, and the supervision of the executive 
(e.g. Roederer-Rynning and Schimmelfennig 2012, Rittberger 2012).  
Additionally, the Lisbon Treaty significantly enhanced the powers of the EP, now providing a joint legislation 
with the Council on almost all EU policy areas. Despite this spectacular transformation, the EP remains a 
parliament of a somewhat different kind compared to national parliaments. While the EP has acquired a 
prominent legislative function in EU policy-making, the function to link up with the citizens lags behind; as 
Eurobarometer repeatedly show, people possess little interest in and knowledge about the EU. Paradoxically, at 
the same time as the EP was consecrated as a co-legislator of EU policy-making, the interest of the ordinary EU 
citizens in EU politics has in general declined. This is partly because of national politicians’ lacking involvement 
in EU politics where they avoid addressing European issues (like the recent Eurozone Crisis). Instead, they tend 
to focus on national questions (Christensen and Nielsen 2013). Hence, the EU has rightfully been termed a 
fragmented democracy; the national level of governance ensures government by and of the people, whereas the 
EU level primarily delivers governance for the people. The democratic problem is then essentially that the EU 
makes policy without politics whereas the Member States provide politics without policy (Schmidt 2006: 5).  
The European Parliament and Input Legitimacy  
Considering the consequences of the alternation of the Presidency in terms of input legitimacy, a central question 
is whether the rotating Presidencies enhance the participatory quality of decision-making now that the EP is co-
legislator with the Council in many more policy areas than before.  
Indeed, the empowerment of the EP has significant implications for the running of Presidencies. If it should 
succeed at the helm of EU, a good connection to the EP is paramount as the EP is now a major institutional player 
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in the important inter-institutional bargaining where the EU Council Presidency facilitates compromises. Thus, if 
a Presidency aims for results it will need to have the EP on its side. For the EU Council Presidency, this infers 
investing time and resources in gaining knowledge about the interests and positions of individual MEPs and EP 
party groups. Secondly, it requires extensive and well-established networks inside the EP to access the most 
relevant EP actors, most notably committee chairmen and rapporteurs. This implies that the EU Council 
Presidency must work more closely than before with the MEPs. Using their networks and expertise enables the 
EU Council Presidency to avoid inter-institutional conflicts, and obtain information on informal negotiations, for 
example, the important Trialogue Negotiations between the Council of the EU, the EP, and the Commission.  
One simple indicator of the increasing importance of the EP for the EU Council Presidencies is the number of 
official meetings held between the Presidency and the EP during the Danish Presidency. From October 2011 to 
the end of the Danish EU Presidency in June 2012, Danish ministers visited the EP nothing less than 85 times, 
encompassing 41 plenary debates and 36 committee meetings plus multiple other visits. During the last Danish 
Presidency (2002), a contrasting number of 70 minister meetings in total were held with the EP.1 Hence, a 
comparison between the previous Danish Presidency held before the Lisbon Treaty changes with the Danish 
Presidency of 2012 clearly shows a changed way of behavior by the Danish EU Council Presidency, 
encompassing increased attention to the supranational EU institutions due to the centralization of the EU Council 
Presidency.  
Another illustration of the increasing importance of the EP for the EU Council Presidency’s work was the choice 
of the Danish government to appoint a permanent Minister for European Affairs, Nicolay Wammen, who as the 
coordinator of the Danish EU policy was very keen on creating a strong relationship to the EP both during and 
after the Presidency (Altinget.dk, 20 August 2012). When the Danish Prime Minister held the ›end of the 
Presidency debate‹ in the EP, many MEPs praised the Danish European Minister for effectively taking into 
account the views of the parliament.2 The government running the previous Danish EU Council Presidency 
(2002) had only appointed a temporary Minister of Europe. By 2012, however, the institutional power balance 
had changed. Consequently, in 2012 the European Minister had turned into a heavier and permanent post, existing 
also after the termination of the EU Council Presidency. We interpret this evolution as an attempt to use the 
Presidency momentum of enhanced interaction with the EP as a way to establish good relations with the 
parliament on a long-term basis.  
Two key priorities of the Danish Presidency were to reach a deal on the Energy Efficiency Directive and getting 
an agreement on a European Patent Reform, including legislation on a Unified Patent Court. Both pieces of 
legislation depended to a large extent on difficult negotiations with the EP. During the negotiations of especially 
the Energy Efficiency Directive, the Danish EU Council Presidency met a hostile EP, highlighting that a 
1  Figures were provided by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 2013.  
2  See plenary debate of the European Parliament, 2 July 2012.  
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compromise was nowhere near. And, as an illustration of the complicated negotiations, the Energy Efficiency 
Directive received nothing less than 2,000 proposals for EP amendments (Euractiv, 13 June 2012). Nonetheless, 
the EU Council Presidency reached deals both in legislative cases, evidently showing strong capability of 
›breaking the code to the EP‹, and facilitating the necessary inter-institutional compromises necessary to close 
negotiations.   
Although the examples above point to intensification of contacts and good relations between the Danish EU 
Council Presidency of 2012 and the EP, the relationship was not unproblematic. Towards the end of the 
presidential term, the conflict between the Danish EU Council Presidency and the EP escalated on the issues of 
the sensitive Schengen Rules and internal border control. As Presidency, Denmark facilitated a Council 
agreement on a new mechanism, allowing Member States to reintroduce internal border control under exceptional 
circumstances. Whereas the European Commission had pushed for greater oversight by the EU institutions on 
evaluation and application of the Schengen rules, the Council agreement underlined that evaluation essentially 
remain in the hands of the Member States. The EP felt side-lined by the Council in the negotiations and 
threatened to boycott the Danish EU Council Presidency as the official Council representative. A boycott of the 
Presidency would inflict serious consequences for the Presidency, being unable to move forward in any 
legislative dossier. At the last minute, however, the EP decided to suspend relations with the Presidency only in 
legislative negotiations concerning Justice and Home Affairs including the rules of the Schengen Agreement. 
Notwithstanding, the crisis with the EP shows that in a post-Lisbon context, the EP appears more powerful than 
ever and needs to be taken seriously by the Presidency to guarantee a successful outcome. Hence a conflict that 
would most likely have been less salient and less prone to escalation in the Danish 2002-Presidency, now 
escalated to previously unknown heights during the Danish 2012-Presidency, which became evident due to the 
intensive and enhanced media coverage which is unusual for EU affairs. In sum, this infers that the centralization 
of the EU power along with the decreased powers of the EU Council Presidency have both changed the power 
balance in favor of the supra-national EU institutions.    
All in all, both the successful and less successful negotiations of the Danish Presidency highlight the importance 
of being well-connected to the EP. Especially, the MEP’s of the same national origin as the Presidency can act as 
important mediators between the EU and the national political level when difficult agreements must be brokered 
or when inter-institutional conflicts arise. Thus, the Danish EU Council Presidency constitutes an important 
learning lesson for national actors of the political opportunities arising when national political representatives are 
brought closer to central EU actors. The intensification of contacts between the national-level Presidency and EU-
level actors during the Danish EU Council Presidency shows how the Presidency can to some degree raise the 
link between the EP and the national level politicians. This may, in turn, lead to a better reflection of the will of 
the national citizens and, ultimately, increase the input legitimacy of EU decision-making. The positive effect of a 
better inclusion of the EP, however, depends on the willingness of national governments to strengthen this 
connection during their Presidency – an effort that may vary significantly from Member State to Member State.   
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The European Parliament and Output Legitimacy  
Considering output legitimacy, the question is what consequences the altered EU Council Presidency has for the 
specific mechanisms of electoral accountability and pluralist policy networks. Arguably, the Presidency does only 
have a limited and indirect impact on output legitimacy when it comes to electoral accountability provided by a 
closer link between national level representatives and MEPs as argued above. The most significant Presidency 
role is to act as a neutral mediator in negotiations and facilitating inter-institutional compromises. And thus its 
actions are more stealth and do not depend and are not exercised in the light of public attention to the same extent 
as, for example, in domestic politics. Yet, when we consider the role of pluralist policy networks during EU 
Presidencies, the empowerment of the EP holds some potential for improving the quality of policy choices. Policy 
networks should here be understood as the informal opportunities of the Presidency of interacting with the EU 
level, which could lead to a better coherence between national and European political concerns.   
Firstly, the relations between the EU Council Presidency and the EP are focused on the Presidency’s ability to 
make a stronger link between EU and domestic politics. A step in this direction is when national representatives 
use the Presidency to develop stronger informal transnational networks with EU-level actors, such as MEPs, 
influencing longer-term opportunities for stronger ties between the EU and national level actors. Thus the 
pluralist network is strengthened through the development of networks beyond the national level, constituting 
alternative channels for influence for national actors.  
Secondly, at the same time as the Lisbon Treaty diminished the opportunities for Presidencies to set the political 
agenda without the interference of other countries in the TRIO Presidency, the Presidency still presents a 
promising opportunity for developing a sense of ownership over the EU agenda. The results of the Danish 
Presidency 2012 serve as a testimony. The Presidency had considerable success in bringing the EU legislative 
agenda forward in different policy areas, ranging from financial regulation to reforms of the Schengen 
Agreement. These successes can largely be contributed to the Presidency’s role as honest broker during important 
negotiations. Yet, regarding the promotion of specific national goals, the results were less significant. Only in 
climate negotiations did the Presidency push the specific Danish agenda. Still, the focus on national preferences 
was only possible since they were congruent with those of the Commission and the EP (Christensen and Nielsen 
2012). 
The fact that the post-Lisbon Presidency is more about delivering common EU results derived from a common 
EU agenda leaves less room for a more narrowly defined national interest-based agenda. This enables the 
Presidency to improve the substantive quality of policy choices if it functions as a mediator between the national 
and European level through established informal networks. Here, networks are not only confined to link the 
national level to the EP-level, but to EU institutions in general. The EP does, however, require special attention 
from the EU Council Presidency due to its recent empowerment. Moreover national governments have ›natural 
allies‹ from the same national party platform inside the EP who, in turn, can establish linkages to the much 
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broader European political party groups and party federations. If the Presidency manages to act as a successful 
›honest broker‹, it may ensure that a wider range of interests and consequences will be taken into consideration in 
the policy-making processes. This way, the EU’s level of output legitimacy can be strengthened as the Presidency 
in a clearer and consistent way serves the common interests of the Union, and not the narrow national interest of 
the Member State holding the Presidency.   
All in all, the Presidency holds some potential for enhancing both input and output legitimacy of EU decision-
making, considering the intensification of contacts between national political representatives and EU-level actors 
such as Members of the European Parliament.  
1.2 The European People  
Discussing the EU Council Presidency, it is frequently highlighted that the rotating Presidency, due to its 
circulating nature between the Member States, enhances the level of legitimacy. In the eyes of the population, the 
EU Council Presidency enhances legitimacy by being close to the European people(s) and by not just remaining a 
remote institution situated in Brussels. The questions are thus: To what extent has this changed through the 
Lisbon Treaty alternations of the Presidency? And have the changes in the Lisbon Treaty provided new 
participatory channels for the citizens which would increase legitimacy?  
The European People and Input Legitimacy  
In many ways the changes to the Presidency further centralized the EU institutions in Brussels. By watering down 
the Presidency through the invention of a Permanent Council President as well as the High Representative – both 
permanently situated in Brussels –, the Presidency is left with less salient political issues. Thus, we expected that 
the Presidency itself, including its host Member State, receive less media attention and, accordingly, removes an 
important means to bring EU closer to the people.   
The question is, however, if the participatory channel of the EU Council Presidency – through active participation 
of the European citizens in policy-making – has ever been an active part of the EU Council Presidency, even 
when it possessed the pre-Lisbon Treaty powers. The Presidency heads the intergovernmental Council of the EU. 
Here 27 different Member States send their national ministers to negotiate EU legislation mainly motivated by 
national interest and preferences. The understanding that the Presidency brings the EU closer to the population 
through the hosting country’s active participation in EU legislation in a somewhat different way than what is 
otherwise obtainable in daily decision-making in Brussels seems unjustified. The negotiations in the Council as 
well as the inter-institutional bargaining, taking place at the EU level have always been a very stealth part of the 
EU decision-making process even when the Presidency was empowered more extensively before the Lisbon 
Treaty.   
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The Lisbon Treaty also included initiatives which were seeking to incorporate the popular participation in EU 
decision-making. Most vividly, this included the aforementioned European Citizen Initiative (ECI), which 
provides the European citizens with the opportunity to propose legislative acts for the Commission. Through a set 
of rules prescribing, for example, that an ECI has to consist of at least one million signatures from at least seven 
different Member States, the citizens can initiate and propose new EU legislation. Though the Commission is not 
forced to act upon an ECI – it is nevertheless obliged to call a hearing when the ECI meets the criteria set in the 
Lisbon Treaty. This way the citizens – for the first time in EU’s history – can interact directly with the 
supranational Commission. Thus, a new opening guaranteeing input legitimacy at the EU level has been opened – 
though the Presidency with the potential of providing national input legitimacy bringing the EU closer to its 
people has seen a diminishing of its powers.  
The ECI is a good example to show that the concentration and centralization of powers from the EU Presidency 
to the supranational EU level in Brussels in the Lisbon Treaty also had counter-initiatives to spark citizens’ 
participation at the supranational level. Hence the Lisbon Treaty both centralized EU decision-making at the same 
time as it introduced new mechanisms of bringing input-legitimating powers into the hands of the European 
people. Whereas it can be argued that the Lisbon Treaty removed powers from the Presidency for the benefit of 
the supranational institutions, and thus removed input legitimizing ways for the people to interact with the EU 
through the circulating EU Presidencies, the Lisbon Treaty nevertheless included new ways the citizens could 
partake in EU politics. Yet, if we are to conclude on the changes of the EU Presidency post 2009, they seem to 
have a slightly negative impact on the possibility for the population to feel closely connected to the EU.  
The European People and Output Legitimacy 
Another way to evaluate the democratic implications of the changes in the Presidency is looking at outcome 
legitimacy. Is the way in which the EU takes decisions and, in particular, the outcome of the decision-making 
process, of a shape that is agreeable for the European people? Probably the best-known proponent of the EU 
being a regulatory unit primarily providing pareto-efficient welfare-oriented outcomes to the EU citizens is 
Majone (e.g. Majone 1998, Majone 2005). Yet, arguably, this has changed with the recent Eurozone crisis with 
the increasing inclusion of more redistributive policies. Have the changes in the EU Presidency played any role in 
this regard?  
Output legitimacy is to be understood in terms of election accountability and pluralist networks. In many ways, 
the Danish EU Presidency was left with the status quo when it came to these two parameters that could 
potentially affect the level of output legitimacy amongst the population (Denmark 2012). The political context of 
the 2012 Presidency was predominantly characterized by a severe economic crisis. The Eurozone crisis from 
2008 onwards had clearly made many more Europeans skeptical of the European project as a whole, and had 
made them turn their backs on attempts to strengthen the Economic and Monetary Union through initiatives 
involving more integration.  
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The increased reluctance for further European integration is found in Eurobarometer surveys in which, for 
example, a total of 42 per cent of the Danish population stated in 2002, when Denmark had the Presidency, that 
they trusted the EU and the European institutions. Only 22 per cent stated they did not trust the EU and the 
European institutions.3 Under the 2012 EU Council Presidency, however, the number of Danes endorsing further 
EU integration and trusting the EU institutions has decreased. Now only 31 per cent of the Danish population 
stated they trust the European institutions, while the number of those not trusting the EU and its institutions has 
increased to 60 per cent.4 In sum, the part of the Danish population that does not trust the European institutions 
has skyrocket from the previous Danish Presidency in 2002 to 2012. These figures show decreasing output 
legitimacy, i.e. that the people distrust the EU to be able to deliver optimal policy solutions. However, these 
figures also show, more importantly in this context, that the rotating Council Presidency does not – as some might 
argue – enhance the popularity of the EU as a whole. As we here only focus on the Danish EU Council 
Presidency, our aim is not to make a claim for all 28 EU Member States where the EU Council Presidency might 
have a larger or smaller influence than in Denmark. Our aim is to understand how being at the helm of the EU 
might change people’s perception of the EU.  
Output legitimacy can also be measured in terms of election turnout. If the electorate supports the policies, and 
feel they have a say in the political decision-making process, we expect voter turnout to be high because people 
feel that their vote matters. Although the past EP election was in 2014, it is still worth highlighting that, despite 
the efforts in treaty amendments of increasing the powers of the EP, voter turnout to EP elections have 
consistently dropped, and were in 2014 the lowest ever recorded since the first direct election to the EP in 1979. 
Only an average of 43 per cent of the Europeans chose to show up and cast a ballot. Their motivation for voting – 
and for staying away – is, of course, diverse. However, the fact is that voter turnout at the EU level remains very 
low compared to the turnout, for example, in national parliament elections. Consequently, output legitimacy can 
be understood to decrease as it can be expected that people would vote if they felt they had a say in the policy-
making and the outcome of the EU was salient to them. Denmark is no exception to the rule of this trend. Though 
recognized for its high level of democratic participation, the Danish turnout in the EP elections has also been 
significantly lower than the election turnout at the national level. For the EP election in 2014, 56.4 per cent of the 
Danish population casted a vote, in contrast to only 47.9 per cent in 2004. As emphasized when exploring the 
extent to which input legitimacy had been raised for the European people after the Lisbon Treaty, the Europeans 
were provided with more channels to participate in the decision-making on the EU level. However, these 
channels do not extend to formalized networks. The Presidencies have not changed with the recent reform in 
ways that enable the European people to exploit pluralist networks in order to gain informal access to policy-
making at the EU level. Informal access implies channels that are not explicitly tied to certain institutions and 
3  Standard Eurobarometer, 2002, No. 57. 
4  Standard Eurobarometer, 2012, No. 77. 
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their decision-making power, but rather involve networks of informal association such as civil society 
organizations.  
Under the Danish EU Presidency the path-breaking Fiscal Treaty was signed and different proposals of economic 
and financial character repeatedly topped the agenda. However, it was not the Presidency but the permanent 
President of the European Council – Herman van Rompuy – who was largely in charge of these negotiations. The 
Fiscal Treaty was of an intergovernmental nature, not a community supranational piece of legislation. 
Characteristic of all these initiatives and legislative acts was the practical absence of citizen input both through 
formal and informal ways. The changes in the Council Presidency did not facilitate more direct or indirect 
participation for the European people. Hence, they cannot be understood to have extensive consequences for 
democratic output legitimacy.     
Conclusion 
We conclude that the changed EU Presidency function – along with the other initiatives empowering the EP in 
the Lisbon Treaty – to a certain degree affected both the behavior and the democratic quality of Presidencies. The 
Presidency now focusses more on inter-institutional compromise-making and bargaining between the EP, the 
Council, and the Commission, leaving less room for the promotion of national interests. The EP empowering also 
holds some potential for improving both input and output legitimacy as it may lead to a better connection between 
national and European political representatives through the Presidency, but only if national governments are 
willing to use it as an opportunity to foster transnational linkages to the EP. The Danish case did show some 
positive signs of the emergence of this, although the strengthened connections might be loosened when the six-
month Presidency period is over.    
Whereas the EP increasingly constitutes a channel of importance, also for the EU Council Presidency, the 
European people have in broad terms been left with a less visible EU function. Though initiatives like the ECI 
enabled the Europeans to enter the otherwise closed EU decision-making procedures, the Presidency has been 
watered out in ways that compromise the salience of the institution. Thus crucial media attention has moved to 
the central institutions in Brussels at the expense of the national level. All this can negatively impact the 
Europeans perception of EU democracy both in terms of input and output legitimacy. 
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